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THE MEANING OF THE TERM "ACCIDENT" IN THE
INDIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
INTRODUCTION
From the time Indiana enacted its first workmen's compensa-
tion statute in 1915,1 its courts have struggled to determine which
claims are compensable under the provisions of the act. This deter-
mination has proven difficult for several reasons. First, the concept
of workmen's compensation is a legislative product,2 and is not based
on any type of common law remedy. Instead, courts are required to
determine if any injury suffered by an employee is sufficiently
related to his employment to warrant compensation. Secondly, each
claimant suffers an injury that is unique in terms of both his
physiological makeup3 and the factual situation surrounding the oc-
currence of the injury.' Finally, courts must interpret the statutory
language in order to define the scope of injuries covered by the Act.
A workmen's compensation statute should not be so broad as to con-
stitute an all-inclusive insurance policy for employees, 5 nor should it
be so limited in scope that the humane purposes of the statute are
defeated.'
Unfortunately, legislatures do not offer much guidance for
courts in the workmen's compensation area. Indiana's statute is
typical, and states that for a claimant to be awarded workmen's
compensation, he must experience an "injury or death by accident
1. B. SMALL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW OF INDIANA § 1.2 at 6 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as SMALL]. The scope of the use of workmen's compensation is broad.
Its use is qualified in that the industry must have accepted the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. However, every employer is presumed to have ac-
cepted the Act unless he is listed in the exceptions to the Act. See IND. CODE § 22-3-2-2
(1976).
2. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1, at 1-4 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as LARSON].
3. Malone, The Limits of Coverage in Workmen's Compensation-The Dual
Requirement Reappraised, 51 N.C.L. REV. 705, 710 (1973).
4. ld.
5. SMALL, supra note 1, § 1.4 at 12.
6. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 251, 297 N.E.2d 425,
427 (1973). See Prater v. Indiana Briquetting Corp., 253 Ind. 83, 251 N.E.2d 810 (1969);
General Printing Corp. v. Umbach, 100 Ind. App. 285, 195 N.E. 281 (1935). See also
SMALL, supra note 1, § 1.4 at 11 n.39, for additional cases supporting a liberal construc-
tion.
Courts are required to liberally construe the Workmen's Compensation Act in
favor of the worker. A definition for "accident" should not hinder the humanitarian
purpose of passing the unfortunate consequenses of an industrial accident from the in-
jured worker to the public as a whole.
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arising out of and in the course of the employment."7 In order to in-
terpret this standard, Indiana courts have formed definitions and in-
terpretations for each term of the statutory phrase. "Injury" is
defined as the physiological consequences or disability that results
from a break or wound in some part of the body.' "Accident" is
equated with unexpectedness." The phrase "arising out of . . . the
employment" is used to determine the causal connection between an
injury and the work being done. 10 The final phrase, "in the course of
the employment," concerns whether the accident occurred in a cer-
tain place and time and under necessary circumstances.' 1 A claimant
must satisfy each term of the statutory definition of a compensable
claim in order to be awarded compensation under the Act.
Recently, controversy has arisen concerning the proper defini-
tion for the term "accident" as it is used in the Indiana Workmen's
Compensation Act. Although there is no agreement in the Indiana
court system, some courts have used "accident" to limit the scope of
the workmen's compensation statute by requiring that the
claimant's injury be more than unexpected.
The purpose of this note is to determine what the proper re-
quirements for accident should be in the context of Indiana's
workmen's compensation law. In making this determination, the
theory and history of the term "accident" will be explored, and the
changes in its meaning will be discussed and analyzed. It is the posi-
tion of this note that "accident" was not meant to significantly limit
7. IND. CODE § 22-3-2-2 (1976).
8. Indian Creek Coal and Mining Co. v. Calvert, 68 Ind. App. 474, 479, 119
N.E. 519, 525, rehearing denied, 187 Ind. 727, 120 N.E. 709 (1918). See generally
SMALL, supra note 1, at § 5.2.
9. See note 12 infra and accompanying text.
10. See Tom Joyce 7 Up Co. v. Layman, 112 Ind. App. 369, 374, 44 N.E.2d
998, 1000 (1942) (quoting Lasaer, Inc. v. Anderson, 99 Ind. App. 428, 434, 192 N.E. 762.
765 (1934)), where the court states:
Generally, an accident may be said to arise out of the employment, where
there is a causal connection between it and the performance of some ser-
vice of the employment . . . at the time of entering into it, or when the
facts show an incidental connection between the conditions under which
employees work and the injury.
11. Id. The accident occurs in the course of the employment if it "takes place
within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably
be, and while he is fulfilling the duties of his employment, or is engaged in doing
something incident to it." Id. Thus, under Layman there are three tests that a claim-
ant has to pass in order to be compensated: the injury must be 1) by "an untoward
event not expected or designed" 2) arising out of, and 3) in the course of the employ-
ment.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 [1979], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol13/iss3/4
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION A CT
claims for compensation. Rather the term should be returned to its
original meaning.
THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF THE TERM "ACCIDENT"
Indiana's courts have historically required only that the
victim's injury be unexpected for it to be considered an "accident."'"
The courts noted that such a definition for accident best reflected
the purposes for which workmen's compensation was intended."
However, this notion was later challenged and more restrictive re-
quirements for the term were implemented by some courts." Conse-
quently the scope of work-related injuries covered under the provi-
sions of the Workmen's Compensation Act was limited. 5 In order to
determine whether this limitation is in keeping with the purpose of
a workmen's compensation program, an examination of the theory
and history of workmen's compensation is necessary.
Basically workmen's compensation is social legislation designed
to provide benefits and medical care for victims of work-related in-
juries. 6 Its theoretical purpose is to shift the burden of a work-
related accident from the injured employee, through the employer,
and ultimately to the consumer."
A recovery under the Act is not based on any type of common
law remedy. 8 Workmen's compensation and common law remedies
12. Haskell and Barker Car Co. v. Brown, 67 Ind. App. 178, 187, 117 N.E. 555,
557 (1917). Accord, Heflin v. Red Front Cash and Carry Stores, 225 Ind. 517, 522, 75
N.E.2d 662, 664 (1947); Estey Piano Corp. v. Steffen, 164 Ind. App. 239, 328 N.E.2d 240
(1975); Chestnut v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 145 Ind. App. 504, 251 N.E.2d 575 (1969); E.
Rauh and Sons Fertilizer Co. v. Adkins, 126 Ind. App. 251, 129 N.E.2d 358 (1956); Cun-
ningham v. Warner Gear Co., 101 Ind. App. 220, 198 N.E. 808 (1935); Townsend &
Freeman Co. v. Taggart, 81 Ind. App. 610, 144 N.E. 556 (1924); Indian Creek Coal and
Mining Co. v. Calvert, 68 Ind. App. 474, 119 N.E. 519 (1918).
13. See note 6 supra.
14. See note 46 infra for cases which have applied more restrictive re-
quirements for "accident."
15. See Estey Piano Corp. v. Steffen, 164 Ind. App. 239, 246, 328 N.E.2d 240,
245 (1975), where Judge Buchanan, in his concurring opinion, discussed his fear of
allowing every work-related injury to be compensated. See also SMALL, supra note 1, §
1 at 12.
16. SMALL, supra note 1, § 1.1 at 2-3.
17. Id. at 1. Workmen's compensation is a form of no-fault insurance. The
employer must carry insurance for his employees to cover injuries arising under
workmen's compensation. The cost of the insurance is passed to the consumer by an in-
crease in the price of the manufactured product. For a thorough analysis of the con-
cepts of workmen's compensation, see generally SMALL, supra note 1, §§ 1.1-1.4; 1 LAR-
SON. supra note 2, §§ 1-3.
18. SMALL, supra note 1, § 1.1 at 2.
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each have distinct characteristics. For example, some injuries for
which claims are now recoverable under workmen's compensation
could have had a remedy in tort. If a complainant suffering such an
injury were to sue in tort, his recovery would be limited only by a
judge or jury. However, a tort claim is subject to the defenses of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk. In a workmen's com-
pensation claim traditional tort defenses are removed," but the
damages are limited by statute."0 For the claimant to receive
workmen's compensation, his injuries must merely satisfy the re-
quirements of a compensable claim as imposed by the legislature
and the courts. 1
Although some difficulties involved with a law suit under the
common law are eliminated by a workmen's compensation statute,
others have developed. One problem concerns attempts to define the
requirements of a compensable claim. The determination of which in-
juries are compensable is made difficult because the unique factual
situations and circumstances surrounding each work-related injury
are nearly impossible to categorize." In view of the wide range of
possible accidents,' the English Parliament in the late nineteenth
century worded its workmen's compensation statute in general
terms: the employer and employee must' "pay and accept compensa-
tion for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in
the course of the employment."2' Thus, England's courts were given
wide discretion to interpret the workmen's compensation statute
with regard to each unique factual situation.25 The state legislatures
in the United States passed workmen's compensation statutes
similar, if not identical to England's," presumably with the same in-
tent. In addition, state legislatures adopted the relevant case pro-
19. IND. CODE § 22-3-2-6 (1976).
20. Id. See § 22-3-3-22 (Supp. 1978), where the Act states that "[wlith respect
to any injury occurring on and after July 1, 1977, the maximum compensation ex-
clusive of medical benefits which shall be paid for an injury under any provision of this
law or any combination of provisions may not exceed sixty thousand dollars ($60,000.),
in any case."
21. See notes 7-11 supra and accompanying text.
22. Malone, supra note 3, at 710.
23. Id.
24. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1897 (60 & 61 Vict. c. 37); WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION ACT 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 58).
25. Malone, supra note 3, at 710.
26. Twenty-nine states have adopted the "by accident" phrase from the
British Act. 1B LARSON. supra note 2, § 37.10 at 7-1. Forty-two states have adopted the
entire British Compensation Act formula: injury "arising out of and in the course of
the employment." 1 LARSON, supra note 2, § 6.10 at 3-1.
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cedents established by English courts.17 When Indiana adopted
England's statute, Indiana courts were given the same discretion to
interpret and define its terms in determining compensability in each
unique factual situation.
2
Following the English example, Indiana courts defined accident
as an "unlooked for mishap or untoward event not expected or
designed."' Basically there are two types of situations to which the
courts' definition must apply: accidents as defined by an unexpected
cause, and accidents as defined by an unexpected result. 0 When an
accident as defined by an unexpected cause occurs, something out-
side the ordinary duties of the workman causes an injury. An explo-
sion which results in injury to an employee is an example of such an
accident. When an accident as defined by an unexpected result oc-
curs, the work being done is the same type and of the same difficul-
ty as is done by the employee every day. The only thing unexpected
is the injury test. A back injury sustained by a mechanic caused by
the routine exertion of tightening a nut is an example of an accident
as defined by an unexpected result.2
There is disagreement whether a claimant should be awarded
compensation when he has suffered an accident as defined by an
unexpected result. In such a situation, most jurisdictions agree that
an accident has occurred and award compensation.2 This agreement
27. In Inland Steel Co. v. Lambert, 66 Ind. App. 246, 248, 118 N.E. 162, 164
(1917), the court noted that Indiana adopted the wording of its workmen's compensa-
tion statute from the British. Indiana also adopted the British precedent. See note 88
infra and accompanying text. See also 1B LARSON, supra note 2, § 38.10.
28. See IND. CODE § 22-3-1-1 (1976). The task of separating compensable and
non-compensable claims for workmen's compensation is for the statutorily created In-
dustrial Board. It must apply workmen's compensation law to the facts of each claim.
Under IND. CODE 22-3-1-3 (1976), it may make conclusions of fact and rulings of law.
However, the statutory provision notes that questions of law are to be determined by
the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Indiana. See generally SMALL, supra note
1, § 12.1 at 366, and 1976 Supp. at 129, for a complete analysis of the functions of the
Industrial board.
29. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
30. SMALL, supra note 1, § 5.2 at 98-100. See also 1B LARSON, supra note 2, §
37.20 at 7-5 where "accident" is divided into four parts: 1) Unexpectedness, a) of cause,
b) of result; 2) Definite time, a) of cause, b) of result. Only the section concerning unex-
pectedness pertains to Indiana. Indiana's courts have made no noticeable distinction
with regard to the definiteness of time. See note 38 infra.
31. See 1B LARSON. supra note 2, §§ 37-38 for further analysis of the dif-
ferences between "unexpected cause" and "unexpected result" accidents.
32. 1B LARSON, supra note 2, § 38.10 at 7-11. A large majority of jurisdictions
agree that an accident has occurred if the injury results in a breakage. The majority of
states agree that an accident has occurred if the injury is the result of a gradual
development. For a detailed list of the situations under which certain states find "ac-
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can be traced back to the English case of Fenton v. Thornley Co.' In
Fenton, the employee's job required that he move a wheel in order
to operate a press. The wheel became caught and the employee was
injured.u The court, noting "that the injury occurred while the man
was engaged in his ordinary work, and in doing or trying to do the
very thing which he meant to accomplish," held that the victim had
suffered an accident and awarded compensation." The rationale of
Fenton was interpreted in the Indiana case, of Indian Creek Coal and
Mining Co. v. Calvert 7 as according "unexpected result" injuries the
status of "accident": "Since the case of Fenton v. Thornley, supra,
nothing more is required than that the harm that the plaintiff has
sustained shall be unexpected. . . . [I]t is enough that the causes,
themselves known and usual, should produce a result which on a
particular occasion is neither designed nor expected."' Thus, it was
determined that the proper requirement for an accident was that
the injury be unexpected.
For many years, the courts of Indiana followed the Fenton ra-
tionale and allowed compensation for accidents as long as the in-
juries were unexpected or unintended. 9 Indiana courts emphasized
that the Workmen's Compensation Act was not intended to narrow
an injured workmen's common law rights, but was to be liberally
construed. The broad "unexpected or unintended" definition for the
term "accident" was considered most closely related to the humane
cidents," see 1B LARSON, supra note 2, at § 38.20. See also note 30 supra, and note 3
infra.
33. [19031 A.C. 443.
34. Id at 445.
35. Id.
36. Id at 456.
37. 68 Ind. App. 474, 492, 119 N.E. 519, 524 (1918).
38. IdA, quoting Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensa-
tion Acts, 25 HARV. L. REV. 328, 340 (1912). Although a time factor has sometimes been
mentioned, Indiana does not have different rules for injury caused by "breakage" and
injury caused by "generalized conditions." In Indian Creek Coal and Mining Co. v.
Calvert, 68 Ind. App. 474, 495, 119 N.E. 519, 525 (1918), the court stated:
This court seems to be committed to the doctrine that a personal injury,
as that term is used in the Workmen's Compensation Act, has reference
not to some break in some part of the body or some wound thereon, or
the like, but rather to the consequenses or disability that results
therefrom.
Accord, Heflin v. Red Front Cash and Carry Stores, Inc., 225 Ind. 517, 75 N.E.2d 662
(1947); Inland Steel Co. v. Almodovar, - Ind. App. - , 361 N.E.2d 181, transfer
denied, __ Ind. - , 366 N.E.2d 169 (1977). Note 32 supra reveals that most states
do make a distinction between "breakage" and "generalized conditions."
39. See note 6 supra.
40. Id
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 [1979], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol13/iss3/4
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION A CT
purposes for which the act was drafted by the legislature.' Hence,
no distinction was made between accident as defined by an unex-
pected result and accident as defined by an unexpected cause with
regard to compensability. This judicial construction of "accident"
continued until 1958, when the Supreme Court of Indiana, in United
States Steel Co. v. Dykes,' questioned the compensability of an acci-
dent as defined by an unexpected result.
CHANGES AND CONFUSION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE DYKES DECISION
Ever since Dykes, 8 Indiana's appellate courts have been con-
fused over what constitutes an accident in the context of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. The case involved a worker who died
as a result of a coronary occlusion while in the course of his normal,
everyday employment activities." The Supreme Court of Indiana
refused compensation, noting that a closer causal connection be-
tween a heart attack and the victim's work was necessary.'
5
However, instead of changing the definition of the statutory phrase
concerning causal connection between work and injury, or dealing
specifically with heart attacks, the Dykes court held that there had
been no "accident." Unfortunately the court did not specify the
degree of change in workmen's compensation law it intended to
bring about, and the lower courts have subsequently interpreted
"accident" in a confusing and inconsistent manner.
Though not easily categorized, three basic interpretations of
"accident" have been attributed to the Dykes decision by the lower
courts: A) Dykes covers all factual situations, and requires an event
or happening beyond the normal scope of employment in order to
constitute an accident; B) Dykes is applicable only to injuries arising
from certain factual situations; C) Dykes requires some type of
unusual event, or some degree of unusual exertion, not necessarily
beyond the normal scope of employment. In order to demonstrate
the confusion brought about by Dykes, the varying applications of
the decision by the courts of Indiana will be further examined.
Dykes Covers All Factual Situations, and Requires an Event or
Happening Beyond the Normal Scope of Employment
Some courts interpret Dykes as establishing a completely new
standard for what types of injuries should be considered "accidents"
41. Id.
42. 238 Ind. 559, 154 N.E.2d 111 (1958).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 602, 154 N.E.2d at 113.
45. Id. at 613, 154 N.E.2d at 118.
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in the context of workmen's compensation." These courts allude to
the last paragraph of the Dykes case as the basis for its holding.
The last paragraph states: "The mere showing that he was perform-
ing his usual routine, everyday task when he suffered a heart at-
tack, does not establish a right to workmen's compensation, because
there was no event or happening beyond the mere employment
itself."'" Consequently, in addition to requiring that the injury be
unexpected, these courts also insist that the injury must have been
caused by some occurrence beyond the normal employment. Ex-
amples of an event or happening beyond the normal employment
itself often occur in the form of an unusual or extreme exertion, or
an unusual event, and courts usually refer to the last paragraph of
Dykes in terms of requiring an "unusual exertion.' 8
An interpretation of accident based on the last paragraph of
Dykes, and thus requiring some type of unusual exertion or event,
would preclude an unexpected result injury from being an
"accident."'" For an unexpected result injury to occur, the victim
must be engaged in his routine duties. An exertion in the course of
one's routine duties can not be "ususual" or "extreme" with regard
to those duties. Hence, such an exertion would not be considered
beyond the normal employment. In courts which follow a "last
paragraph" interpretation of Dykes, an accident as defined by an
unexpected result can never occur for lack of an unusual exertion or
event.
46. See Rivera v. Simmons Co., 164 Ind. App. 381, 329 N.E.2d 39 (1975),
transfer denied, 264 Ind. 401, 345 N.E.2d 227 (1976); Dooley v. Richard's Standard
Serv., 145 Ind. App. 470, 251 N.E.2d 449 (1969); City of Anderson v. Borton, 132 Ind.
App. 684, 178 N.E.2d 904 (1962); Bundy v. Concrete Ready-Mix Co., 130 Ind. App. 542,
167 N.E.2d 477 (1960); B. G. Hoadley Quarries, Inc. v. Eads, 129 Ind. App. 670, 160
N.E.2d 202 (1959).
47. United States Steel Co. v. Dykes, 238 Ind. 599, 613, 154 N.E.2d 111, 119
(1958).
48. Id. at 604, 154 N.E.2d at 117, where the court mentions the terms
"unusual exertion" and "extreme exertion." Other Indiana courts that also mention an
"unusual exertion" in regard to the requirements for "accident" established by Dykes
include: Inland Steel Co. v. Almodovar, __ Ind. App. - , 361 N.E.2d 181, transfer
denied, __ Ind. __ , 366 N.E.2d 169 (1977); Rivera v. Simmons Co., 164 Ind. App.
381, 329 N.E.2d 39 (1975), transfer denied, 264 Ind. 401, 345 N.E.2d 227 (1976); Estey
Piano Corp. v. Steffen, 164 Ind. App. 329, 328 N.E.2d 240 (1975); Chestnut v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 145 Ind. App. 504, 251 N.E.2d 575 (1969); City of Anderson v. Borton, 132
Ind. App. 684, 178 N.E.2d 904 (1962); B. G. Hoadley Quarries, Inc. v. Eads, 129 Ind.
App. 670, 160 N.E.2d 202 (1959).
49. See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text for a definition of "unex-
pected result" injuries, and accidents as defined by unexpected results.
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An example of an "unexpected result" injury for which the claim-
ant was denied compensation for lack of an accident is illustrated
by Rivera v. Simmons Co.5' That case involved a tool and die worker
who suffered a back injury while placing a ninety pound die on a
rack.5 This work constituted part of the injured worker's regular
and normal duties. 52 The Court of Appeals for the Second District
approved the Industrial Board's negative award, holding that there
was no "unlooked for mishap, untoward or unexpected event,"53 and
thus no accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act."
Cases holding similar to Rivera indicate that some courts
believe that the last paragraph of Dykes was the essence of the
decision. These cases have interpreted Dykes as a limitation on the
coverage of the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act so that no
claimant is compensated for work-related injuries unless there is a
strong showing of a causal connection between work and injury.5
However, others note that such a restrictive interpretation
eliminates many legitimate claims and qualify the Dykes decision in
various ways.
Dykes is Applicable Only to Injuries Resulting From Certain Fac-
tual Situations
A second category of Indiana decisions has interpreted the last
paragraph of Dykes to be merely one basis for the holding of that
case. In doing so, the decisions have confined the influence of Dykes
to particular factual situations. The cases awarding compensation
are not actually contrary to a "last paragraph" interpretation of
Dykes, but the results are different from those which would have
been reached had a "last paragraph" interpretation been applied to
the facts.' Under the cases in this category, no unusual exertion on
50. 164 Ind. App. 381, 329 N.E.2d 39 (1975), transfer denied, 264 Ind. 401, 345
N.E.2d 227 (1976) (Hunter, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Hunter noted that the
court of appeals "severely limited the scope of compensable injuries under the act." Id.
at 402, 345 N.E.2d at 228. The transfer was denied because the issue was settled out of
court.
51. 164 Ind. App. 381, 383, 329 N.E.2d 39, 40 (1975).
52. Id, at 384, 329 N.E.2d at 41.
53. Id, at 386, 329 N.E.2d at 43.
54. Id.
55. This strong showing is determined on the basis of an unusual exertion re-
quirement for "accident." See Estey Piano Corp. v. Steffen, 164 Ind. App. 329, 246, 328
N.E.2d 240, 245 (1975), where Judge Buchanan discussed his fears in regard to allowing
every work-related injury to be compensated.
56. An examination of the dissenting and concurring opinions in Ellis v. Hub-
be] Metals, Inc., - Ind. App. - , 366 N.E.2d 207 (1977); Inland Steel Co. v.
19791
Jaskowiak: The Meaning of the Term "Accident" in the Indiana Workmen's Compe
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1979
544 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
the part of the employee is required in certain situations. Hence,
some accidents as defined by unexpected result may be compen-
sated.
An example of an "unexpected result" injury determined to be
an accident within the meaning of the Indiana Workmen's Compen-
sation Act is found in Inland Steel Co. v. Almodovar In
Almodovar, the claimant's job required him to tighten bands on
steel rolls by using a compressed air hand tool.5 The claimant's nor-
mal duties included pulling a seventy-five foot air hose free from a
conveyor system seven to eight times per day.5 9 The claimant suf-
fered a back injury while pulling the entangled hose free of the con-
veyor." The Almodovar court determined that the claimant had a
pre-existing back condition,"1 and in granting compensation, held
that the Dykes rationale, which requires an unusual exertion, did
not apply to cases where a pre-existing condition was present.2
Thus, the holding of Almodovar suggests that claims for "unex-
pected result" injuries are compensable if there is evidence of the
aggravation of a pre-existing condition in the area of the injury.
Moreover, Almodovar states that the requirement of "some type of
untoward or unexpected incident" in order for a claim to be compen-
sable applies only when there is no evidence of aggravation of a pre-
existing injury. 3
Almodovar, - Ind.App. - , 361 N.E.2d 181, transfer denied, - Ind. , 366
N.E.2d 169 (1977); Estey Piano Corp. v. Steffen, 164 Ind. App. 329, 328 N.E.2d 240
(1975), leads one to such a conclusion. The judges often point out that the factual situa-
tions do not fit the requirements set out by the last paragraph of United States Steel
Co. v. Dykes, 238 Ind. 599, 154 N.E.2d 111 (1958), which calls for an "unusual exertion."
57. - Ind. App. - , 361 N.E.2d 181 (Buchanan, J., dissenting on the
grounds that no "accident" had occurred), transfer denied, - Ind. __ , 366 N.E.2d
169 (1977) (Privarnik, J., dissenting on the grounds that the decision was contrary to
Dykes).
58. Id. at - , 361 N.E.2d at 189.
59. Id.
60. Id. at . 361 N.E.2d at 183.
61. Id. at __ , 361 N.E.2d at 185.
62. Id. at __ , 361 N.E.2d at 184.
63. Id. A test similar to that used by the court in Inland Steel Co. v.
Almodovar, - Ind. App. - , 361 N.E.2d 181 transfer denied, __ Ind. - , 366
N.E.2d 169 (1977), to determine accident was used in Callahan v. Lovelace Truck Serv.,
149 Ind. App. 314, 271 N.E.2d 734 (1971), where the court found that Dykes applies
only to cases where there is no evidence of aggravation of a pre-existing injury.
The Almodovar court arrived at its decision through what might be considered
faulty reasoning. It noted that the "unusual exertion" requirement of Dykes does not
apply to accidents which are aggravations of pre-existing conditions. However, in order
for an injury which is an aggravation of a pre-existing condition to be'compensable, it
must occur in "such circumstances that he [the injured worker] might have obtained
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Like Almodovar, Chestnut v. Coca Cola Bottling Co." dis-
tinguished the factual situation of Dykes. However, contrary to
Almodovar, Chestnut limits the Dykes rationale to injuries which in-
volve pre-existing conditions in the area of the injury. The claimant
in Chestnut was not awarded compensation because there was suffi-
cient evidence to sustain the full Industrial Board's decision that no
award should be made. 5 Nevertheless, the Chestnut court took upon
itself the task of defining what types of injuries Dykes covered for
the future benefit of the Industrial Board." The Chestnut court held
that the Dykes doctrine merely supplemented the original definition
of "accidents." 7 The court further found that the Dykes doctrine ap-
plied only to cases in which the victim had a pre-existing condition
in the area of the injury." Thus, any injury which was not an ag-
gravation of a pre-existing condition was not to be covered by the
Dykes rationale.
Contrary interpretations of Dykes by such cases as Chestnut
and Almodovar reflect confusion as to what situations Dykes should
cover.69 However, underlying this confusion is a general dislike for
compensation under a Workmen's Compensation Act on account of the injury had
there been no disease involved." Inland Steel Co. v. Almodovar, __ Ind. App. - ,
__ , 361 N.E.2d 181, 184 (1977), quoting Heflin v. Red Front Cash and Carry Stores,
Inc., 225 Ind. 517, 520 75 N.E.2d 662, 664 (1947). Under the reasoning of Heflin, it
would seem that an injury which is an aggravation of a pre-existing condition must
satisfy the requirements of compensability that all injuries must satisfy. Instead of be-
ing more easily compensable, aggravation type injuries not only must satisfy the
unusual exertion requirements of Dykes, but also must occur under circumstances
which indicate that the disease is materially aggravated.
64. 145 Ind. App. 504, 251 N.E.2d 575 (1969).
65. Id at 510, 251 N.E.2d at 577. Judge White dissented on this point noting
that an accident had occurred. Id. at 512, 251 N.E.2d at 578.
66. Id. at 510, 251 N.E.2d at 577.
67. Id. at 511, 251 N.E.2d at 578. The original definition of "accident" was
cited in Haskell and Barker Car Co. v. Brown, 67 Ind. App. 178, 117 N.E. 555, 557
(1917), where the court defined the term to be a "mishap or untoward event not ex-
pected or designed."
68. 145 Ind. App. at 507, 251 N.E.2d at 579.
69. Confusion as to precisely what Dykes means is evidenced by the following
decisions made by the Court of Appeals for the Second District: Inland Steel Co. v.
Almodovar, __ Ind. App. - , 361 N.E.2d 181, transfer denied, __ Ind. - , 366
N.E.2d 169 (1977); Rivera v. Simmons Co., 164 Ind. App. 381, 329 N.E.2d 39 (1975),
transfer denied, 264 Ind. 401, 345 N.E.2d 227 (1976); Estey Piano Corp. v. Steffen, 164
Ind. App. 329, 328 N.E.2d 240 (1975). Although in Estey Piano, the court determined
that the victim had suffered from an "unusual exertion," one may infer from the opi-
nion that an unusual exertion is not necessary for an injury to be an accident. The
decisions lead one to believe that the three judges of the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond District each have a somewhat different opinion of how Dykes changed the concept
of accident.
Judge Buchanan (author of Rivera) believes that an unusual exertion or some
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the necessity of finding that the claimant's injury was the result of
an unusual exertion or event before an accident can occur. The
unusual exertion requirement precludes many claims from being
compensated for lack of an accident. Hence, many courts distinguish
their factual situations from Dykes so that an unusual-exertion test
for accident is unnecessary. In this manner courts reach what they
may consider to be a more just result in view of the fact situations."0
Dykes Requires Some Type of Unusual Event, or Some Degree of
Unusual Exertion Not Necessarily Beyond the Normal Scope of
Employment
The third category of cases, like the first two, acknowledges
the unusual-exertion test for accident established in Dykes. How-
ever, the cases in the third group confine the application of Dykes
to situations in which the injured employee was not performing any
duties or tasks concerning his work. For Dykes to apply the injury
must be incurred without any exertion. In these cases emphasis is
not on the existence or non-existence of a condition prior to the in-
jury. Instead, if the injured employee was engaged in his usual work
other type of event or happening beyond the victim's normal employment is necessary
before an injury may be considered an accident. Such an opinion is in accordance with
the last paragraph of Dykes. Rivera v. Simmons Co., 164 Ind. App. 381, 329 N.E.2d 39,
41 (1975). Unexpected result injuries would not be considered "accidents."
Judge Sullivan (author of Estey Piano) noted that experiencing a sharp pain
while lifting a piano key bed which results in an injury would constitute an accident.
Estey Piano Corp. v. Steffen, 164 Ind. App. 239, 245, 328 N.E.2d 240, 243 (1975. Hence,
Judge Sullivan would designate accidents as defined by unexpected result as "ac-
cidents" in the context of workmen's compensation.
Judge White (author of Almodovar) has noted that the accident requirement
should be satisfied by "the sudden onset of severe pain." Thus, Judge White would
determine unexpected result injuries to be "accidents." Rivera v. Simmons Co., 164
Ind. App. 381, 388, 329 N.E.2d 39, 44 (1975) (White, J., concurring).
Judge White's position seems to be near that of Judge Sullivan's. However, the
Almodovar decision notes that the Dykes doctrine is inapplicable to aggravation-type
injuries. Implicit in the decision is that Judge White believes an unusual exertion may
be necessary for "accident" in some situations. One may at least infer that Judge
White might apply the Dykes rationale to some type of factual situation. See Survey
of Recent Developments in Indiana Law- Workmen's Compensation, 9 IND. L. REv.
389 (1975), for a discussion of Estey Piano and Rivera.
70. Other cases that have restricted Dykes to certain factual situations in a
manner consistent with either Almodovar or Chestnut include Callahan v. Lovelace
Truck Serv., 149 Ind. App. 314, 271 N.E.2d 734 (1971), and Anaconda Aluminum Co. v.
Aue, 136 Ind. App. 463, 202 N.E.2d 403 (1964). Cf. Estey Piano Corp. v. Steffen, 164
Ind. App. 329, 328 N.E.2d 240 (1975). The court noted that there had been sufficient
unusual exertion to constitute an accident. Id. at 246, 328 N.E.2d at 244. However, im-
plicit in the opinion is the idea that the sudden onset of pain itself is an accident.
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when he was injured, he would suffer an "accident." In such cases,
almost all "unexpected result" injuries could be defined as accidents.
The case of Lock-Joint Tube Co. v. Brown71 presents an exam-
ple of this limited application of Dykes. In Lock-Joint the claimant
aggravated a pre-existing back condition while lifting a steel panel
weighing seventy pounds.7 ' Lifting the panels constituted part of
the claimant's normal duties." The court found an accident had
occurred 4 and granted compensation. 5 It noted that the employee in
Dykes was not performing any work or duty when he suffered a
heart attack." Because the heart attack was suffered "without any
exertion," the Lock-Joint court felt that the Dykes rationale should
be confined to such cases.7
Cases such as Lock-Joint, which interpret the Dykes decision
as covering injuries that occur without any exertion, severely limit
the application of the Dykes doctrine. It is doubtful that the
Supreme Court of Indiana, in establishing a standard for "accident"
in workmen's compensation cases,8 would limit the application of
such a standard to cases where the employee suffered an injury
without any exertion. In addition, Dykes specifically noted that the
employee was engaged in his regular work when he suffered a heart
attack.79 This fact seemingly precludes the Lock-Joint court's conclu-
sion that he was not performing his usual work duties. While it may
be argued that the victim in Dykes was not performing his regular
duties, the Supreme Court of Indiana based its decision on the
assumption that he was."0 A limitation of Dykes to cases where the
employee was not performing any work duty is another means of
eliminating the necessity for an unusual exertion in order to find an
"accident."'" Such a limitation is indicative of a general dislike for an
unusual-exertion test.
71. 135 Ind. App. 386, 191 N.E.2d 110 (1963).
72. Id. at 387, 191 N.E.2d at 111.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 390, 191 N.E.2d at 114.
75. Id. at 390, 191 N.E.2d at 114.
76. Id at 389, 191 N.E.2d at 113.
77. Id. at 390, 191 N.E.2d at 114 (emphasis original).
78. See note 95 infra and accompanying text.
79. United States Steel Co. v. Dykes, 238 Ind. 599, 600, 154 N.E.2d 111, 118
(1958).
80. Id.
81. Another decision that has restricted Dykes in a manner similar to that of
Lock-Joint Tube Co. v. Brown, 135 Ind. App. 386, 191 N.E.2d 110 (1963), is Ellis v. Hub-
bell Metals, Inc., __ Ind. App. - , 366 N.E.2d 207 (1977). Judge Hoffman dissented
on the grounds that the decision was contrary to that of Dykes in that no "accident"
occurred. Id. at 215.
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All Indiana courts have determined that an unusual exertion is
necessary for some type of injury to be considered an accident,
although numerous decisions have limited the application of the
Dykes doctrine to specific factual situations. By so limiting the ap-
plication of the unusual-exertion test, courts have been able in some
instances to award compensation for accidents as defined by "unex-
pected result." However, a claimant who has suffered an unexpected
result injury has no guarantee that his injury will be considered an
accident in the context of the Workmen's Compensation Act. As has
been demonstrated, the status of the term "accident" in Indiana
workmen's compensation law is not clear. A claimant's recovery is
thus dependent upon a court's interpretation given to the Dykes
case.
Much of the confusion over the correct interpretation of Dykes
is a result of judicial attempts to circumvent the unusual-exertion
test in order to reach a just result. Further examination of the
unusual-exertion test and its application reveals why circumvention
is often necessary and justified.
CRITICISM OF THE DYKES DECISION
As was evidenced by the preceding section, there is confusion
among the Indiana courts regarding the meaning of the Dykes deci-
sion. That Dykes created confusion is the first aspect of the case
which must be criticized.' Because courts interpret Dykes in at
least three distinct manners, further criticism of the application of
Dykes must be qualified to the respective interpretation given it by
each group of courts. If one assumes that Dykes covers all cases in-
volving accidents and requires an event or happening beyond the
normal employment itself in order to consitute an "accident,"' prob-
lems concerning legislative intent and judicial precedent arise. In
addition, the unusual-exertion test which most courts have at-
tributed to Dykes does not effectively determine which injuries
should be considered accidents so as to facilitate compensation. Fur-
thermore one may assume that Dykes was attempting to deal with
the unique problems of causal connection between work and injury
posed by heart attack claims. The solution was in the form of an
unusual-exertion test for the term "accident." While this solution
may eliminate certain heart attack claims, it also leads to additional
problems in the workmen's compensation field.
82. See pages 541-548 of text, supra, for examples of the confusion created
by the Dykes decision. For a specific example, see note 69 supra.
83. See notes 42-55 supra and accompanying text.
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Precedent and Legislative Intent
Courts that hold the Dykes rationale applicable to all claims for
compensation under Indiana's Workmen's Compensation Act may do
so in contradiction to the intent of the legislature. Under this ap-
plication of Dykes, an unusual exertion or event is required before
any accident can occur. Such an interpretation of accident excludes
unexpected result injuries" from being considered accidents, 5 and
the scope of compensability under the provisions of workmen's com-
pensation is severely limited. This limitation is inconsistent with
legislative intent.88
The wording of the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act was
taken from the English Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897.87
When an act is adopted by another legislature, the construction
given the terms of the original act is also adopted. 88 Therefore, the
construction given the term "accident" as it is used in workmen's
compensation should arguably be the same in Indiana as in England.
English cases, most notably Fenton v. Thornley Co., determined that
a claimant who suffered an accident as defined by an unexpected
result should be compensated. 8 A construction which would prevent
an accident as defined by an unexpected result from being con-
sidered an accident in the context of workmen's compensation is in
direct conflict with the construction afforded the term "accident" by
the English. Hence, it is also in conflict with the construction for
"accident" adopted by the Indiana Legislature. For if the Indiana
Legislature had intended that a claim based on an unexpected result
84. See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text for a definition of unex-
pected result injuries.
85. See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text.
86. In addition, the definition of a compensable claim should be liberally con-
strued so as not to defeat the humane purposes of the act. See note 6 supr.
87. Inland Steel Co. v. Lambert, 66 Ind. App. 246, 253, 118 N.E. 162, 164
(1917). Although the ENGLISH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT OF 1897, L.R. Stat. 60-61,
Vict. p. 53, was replaced by the ENGLISH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT OF 1906, 6
Edw. VII, ch. 58, the wording of the definition of a compensable claim remained the
same.
88. 66 Ind. App. at 253, 118 N.E. at 164, quoting Jarvis v. Hitch, 161 Ind. 217,
221, 67 N.E. 1057, 1059 (1903):
[Ilt is common learning that the adjusted construction of the terms of the
statute is enacted as well as the terms themselves, when an act which has
been passed by the Legislature of one state or country is afterwards pass-
ed by the Legislature of another; . . . for if it were intended to exclude
any known construction of the previous statute, the legal presumption is
that its terms would be so changed as to effect that intention.
89. Fenton v. Thornley Co., 119031 A.C. 443. Accord, Clover, Clayton and Co.
v. Hughes, 19101 A.C. 242, 3 B.W.C.C. 775.
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injury be denied compensation, it would have noted a change in the
construction of "accident" when it adopted England's workmen's
compensation statute.9
This is not to say that an original construction of "accident"
may never be changed. However, sound policy arguments are
necessary before a court should overturn a definition that has
legislative approval. Such arguments are not found in Dykes. Dykes
establishes in the last paragraph of the opinion what some courts
believe to be an entirely new construction for "accident." 91 Surely
more than one small paragraph is necessary to introduce and justify
the sweeping changes that Dykes supposedly brought about.
Therefore, decisions that require an "unlooked for mishap or un-
toward event beyond the mere employment itself'"" in order for an
accident to occur should be considered contrary to legislative intent.
Criticism of Unusual Exertion
All Indiana courts do not always require an event beyond the
normal employment in every case before an "accident" can occur."
Consequently they all are not subject to the criticism concerning a
"last paragraph" interpretation of Dykes. However, to varying ex-
tents, all courts have acknowledged the Dykes rationale, 5 which is
objective in nature," and requires an."unlooked for mishap or un-
toward event beyond the mere employment itself '9 7 in order for an
90. See note 88 supra.
91. United States Steel Co. v. Dykes, 238 Ind. 599, 613, 154 N.E.2d 111, 119
(1958).
92. Perhaps the reason that the Dykes decision has lasted so long is that
some courts have not interpreted it to require an unusual exertion or have distinguish-
ed its factual situation. See notes 56-83 supra and accompanying text.
93. United States Steel Co. v. Dykes, 238 Ind. 599, 613, 154 N.E.2d 111, 119
(1958).
94. As was indicated in the previous section entitled "Changes and Confusion
Brought About by the Dykes Decision," at p. 541, only the cases in the first subsec-
tion require an event beyond the normal employment in every case before an "acci-
dent" can occur. The cases in the two other subsections do not make this requirement
in every situation.
95. The distinctions in the section concerning the changes brought about by
Dykes are based on the degree of acceptance that the courts have given to the Dykes
decision. While cases in the third subsection nearly construe the unusual exertion re-
quirement out of existence, they do indicate that an unusual exertion is needed before
an accident can be found in some situations.
96. Objective as opposed to subjective in terms of the type of analysis used.
See p. 558 for a discussion of the differences between objective and subjective
analysis in the context of workmen's compensation claims.
97. United States Steel v. Dykes, 238 Ind. 599, 606, 154 N.E.2d 111, 119 (1958).
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accident to occur. Courts often speak of Dykes as requiring an
unusual exertion by the victim in his work before his claim may be
compensated." In addition to the criticism concerning the elimina-
tion of accidents as defined by unexpected results, 9 an unusual-
exertion test is inadequate for the purpose of separating claims wor-
thy of compensation from claims unworthy of compensation. This is
true for the following reasons: 1) the unusualness of the exertion is
measured only in terms of the job; 2) it is difficult to determine the
requirements of an unusual exertion.
1. Measuring Standards
Courts consider "unusual exertion" in terms of "an event or
happening beyond the mere employment itself."1 °0 As a result the
unusualness of the exertion is measured only with regard to the re-
quirements of the job. Neither the physical makeup and strength of
the employee nor the amount of exertion are considered in the
determination of whether an "accident" has occurred. Such in-
complete analysis, which disregards factors that should bear on
whether an injury is worthy of compensation, can result in inconsis-
tent and unfair results.
The inadequate scope of the unusual-exertion test, which
measures exertion only in terms of the job, is illustrated by the
following example: The routine duties of worker A require him to lift
items weighing 100 pounds. Worker B routinely lifts 20 pound items
on his job. If A strains his back while lifting a 100 pound item, he
will be denied compensation. Whereas if B lifts the same 100 pound
item and is injured, he will be compensated. This result is based on
the fact that A, in lifting the 100 pound item, had not exerted
himself unusually because he lifted 100 pound items as part of his
normal duties. Worker B only lifted 20 pound items; an exertion re-
quired to lift a 100 pound item would be unusual as compared with
B's normal duties.'01 Surely a test that measures only one of many
98. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. The unusual exertion require-
ment is only one type of "unlooked for or untoward event" beyond the normal employ-
ment. However it is a very popular form, and acknowledged as a test to determine if
the injury is beyond the normal employment.
99. See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text.
100. United States Steel Co. v. Dykes, 238 Ind. 599, 606, 154 N.E.2d 111, 119
(1958).
101. See 1B LARSON, supra note 2, §§ 38.60-.64, for discussion of problems
concerning an unusual exertion test. In an earlier edition, Dean Larson illustrated the
inequities of the measuring standard by comparing the factual situations of the follow-
ing two decisions. In Marlowe v. Huron Mountain Club, 271 Mich. 107, 260 N.W. 130
(1935), the claimant, a longshoreman, whose routine duties included lifting 200 pound
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relevant factors is inadequate for the purposes of fairly determining
whether an accident has occurred.
Moreover, the routineness of the work performed by the in-
dividual worker is not considered in the application of the unusual-
exertion test. What may be an unusual exertion for one worker may
not be for another, depending on the physical makeup of the in-
dividual. Suppose that in the previous example, worker A was 55
years old, sickly, and weighed 135 pounds. Further suppose that
worker B was in prime physical condition, being 30 years old, six
feet two inches tall and weighing 195 pounds. In an application of
the unusual-exertion test, where the unusualness of the exertion is
measured with regard to the normal requirements of the job, such
statistics, although clearly relevant, would not be considered.102
2. Qualifications for an Unusual Exertion
In addition to the inequities that result from an incomplete
analysis of all the relevant factors involved in an injury, the
unusual-exertion test is not easily applied. It is difficult to deter-
mine what qualifies as an "unusual exertion." Because each injury is
unique, courts often lack sufficient guidelines to aid in the'deter-
mination of whether an exertion is unusual as compared with the
normal duties of the work.
If a workman's duties include lifting 200 pound boxes, would an
injury incurred by the workman when he lifted a box that weighed
201 pounds be the result of an unusual exertion? What if the box
weighed 210 pounds or 250 pounds? There is' some point in time
when the exertion will become unusual. However, there is no effi-
cient method available to discover the precise moment when that
point in time is reached.
sacks, was denied compensation when he was injured in lifting one of the sacks even
though the strain medically contributed to his injury. Compensation was granted in
Philadelphia Dairy Products Co. v. Farran, 44 Del. 380, 57 A.2d 88 (1948), where a
salesman was injured while engaged in the "unusual" activity of lifting a fifteen pound
parcel. Marlowe has been overruled by Sheppard v. Michigan National Bank, 348 Mich.
577, 83 N.W.2d 614 (1957). See 1A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION,
§ 622.17 (1967). However, the comparison still serves to illustrate the inadequacies of
the unusual-exertion test. In jurisdictions that still apply an unusual-exertion test, such
inconsistent and unfair results could still occur. See 1B LARSON, supra note 2, § 38.83
at 7-173.
102. The statistics may be relevant if the issue of aggravation of a pre-existing
condition is present. The relevancy would be limited to the condition of the injured
worker with regard to the area of aggravation.
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The problem becomes more complex if a workman lifts boxes of
different weights, some of which weigh 200 pounds, but with an
average weight of 100 pounds. Should the workman be compensated
if he is injured while lifting a 200 pound box? The exertion required
to lift the 200 pound box is unusual as compared with the average
exertion, but it is not greater than the maximum exertion required.
In this situation a determination must be made as to how many
times per day or per week a 200 pound box must be lifted so that
such an exercise can be considered a usual requirement of the job.
In sum an unusual-exertion test for "accident" arbitrarily
separates injuries to the categories of compensable and non-
compensable. Unfortunately, due to its objective nature and the in-
complete analysis of the test, there is no correlation between the
results of the unusual-exertion test for "accident" and the purpose
for which it was established-to help distinguish those claims wor-
thy of compensation from those claims unworthy of compensation. '
The effect of the unusual-exertion test has been to limit the
number of claims compensable under the act. This has been ac-
complished through the application of the unusual exertion require-
ment for "accident." To satisfy the "accident" requirement for com-
pensation, one must not only suffer an accident, but the accident
must be of a certain variety.'0 The Indiana Supreme Court may
have desired this result in view of the characteristics of heart
disease.
Heart Attacks
The Dykes court dealt with the special problem posed by heart
attacks on the job."' Due to the nature of heart disease, it is often
difficult to determine if a causal relationship between the injury and
the work is sufficiently established to warrant recovery in heart at-
tack cases. It is suggested that the Dykes court introduced a more
restrictive test for "accident" to help determine compensability
because it found that the causal relationship between work and
heart attack was often indeterminable. The court required that for
103. See notes 100-102 supra and accompanying text. See also 1B LARSON.
supra note 2, §§ 38.60-.64; Comment, Problems of Proving Causation in Cardiac
Cases Arising Under the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act, 1969 U. TOL. L. REV.
165, 181.
104. The accident must have been caused by an unusual exertion. See note 48
supra.
105. United States Steel Co. v. Dykes, 238 Ind. 599, 154 N.E.2d 111 (1958). See
note 106 infra and accompanying text.
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an injury to be considered an accident, it had to be the result of "an
event or happening beyond the mere employment itself.""'  How-
ever, it will be demonstrated that a more restrictive definition of
"accident" that would be applicable to all claims should not be
substituted to determine compensability when a causal connection
between work and heart attack is indeterminable.
Because of the nature of heart disease, heart attack claims pre-
sent a unique definitional problem with regard to their compensability
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is widely agreed medically
that no single event can cause a heart attack if the heart is healthy,
regardless of the degree of exertion imposed."°7 Thus heart attacks
usually result from the cumulative effects of some type of heart
disease."8 Because of this it is difficult to determine the role, if any,
of the victim's work in a heart attack.
The difficulty in determining the causal connection between
work and heart attack is intensified by the differences in medical
and legal causation. To prove a causal connection between heart at-
tack and work, the testimony of medical experts is necessary. Unfor-
106. Id. at 606, 154 N.E.2d at 119. That the Dykes court was concerned with
the problem of establishing a causal connection between heart attacks and work for
the purposes of determining compensability is indicated by note 3 of the decision
which states:
The medical theory of a situation such as that presented by the record
here is ably stated by Dr. Alan R. Moritz in an article "Coronary Throm-
bosis," J.A.M.A. Vol. 156, No. 14, pages 1306-1309, reprinted in the 1955
Medical Trial Technique Quarterly, pages 67 to 77, at page 74, as follows:
"Frequently it is difficult or impossible to evaluate the significance
of the particular episode of stress or injury that the disabled person
stipulates (claims) as the precipitating cause of his disability. If the event
stipulated is clearly unusual and if it was followed immediately by heart
(cardiac) failure, the relationship may be reasonably clear. Often the event
stipulated is not sufficiently unusual to distinguish it from other nonoc-
cupational stresses that may have occurred about the same time. Thus, it
may be alleged that coronary insufficiency or heart failure was
precipitated by lifting a 40 lb. box from an overhead shelf. Such an exer-
tion may have been no greater than that of sneezing or straining at stool,
either or both events may have had the same relationship to the onset of
heart (cardiac) disability as did the stress of lifting the box. In cir-
cumstances of this type no one can assert with propriety that any one of
these episodes of stress was more likely than any other to have provided
the excess work load that caused the diseased heart to fail."
Id. at 612, 154 N.E.2d at 118.
107. Hellmuth & Hellmuth, Heart Attack and Workmen's Compensation.
Model Rules of Practice, 4 FORUM 113 (1969). See also J. SAGALL & C. REED, THE
HEART AND THE LAW (1968).
108. Id.
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tunately there is a language barrier between doctors and lawyers
concerning causation in that each group places emphasis on two dif-
ferent aspects of the term.' Generally a doctor is concerned with
cause as it relates to the physiological facts associated with a bodily
malfunction. To a lawyer, cause has to do with the outside events
which lead to and are responsible for a bodily malfunction. The dif-
ference in emphasis between a doctor and a lawyer regarding cause
is illustrated by the following example: If a man is shot to death, a
doctor would be inclined to say that the victim's death was caused
by a loss of blood. In the same situation, a lawyer would say that
the victim's death was the culmination of an argument between the
victim and his assailant. The lawyer would look to the reasons for
the shooting in terms of a relationship between acts and results.
The doctor would look to the physiological reasons for the death."0
In order to compensate a heart attack claim, the physiological
cause of injury must also be the legal cause."' While all doctors can
testify as expert witnesses to the general physiological symptoms
and conditions involved in heart attacks, only a few medical experts
are actually qualified to determine the legal cause of a heart
attack."' Moreover the determination of the specific legal cause of
heart attacks, even by experts, is beyond the limits of medical
science."' Apparently most doctors are unaware of the significant
differences between legal and medical causation. In many heart at-
tack cases there is "expert" testimony stating that the work was
the legal cause of the heart attack and "expert" testimony stating
that it was not."' Such a situation is favorable to the employee.
Because a causal connection between heart attacks and work is
often indeterminable, and because one may obtain "expert" opinion
stating that the heart attack could have been caused by the work,
claims for compensation could be granted for victims of heart at-
tacks even though no causal connection between work and the heart
attack existed.
Since the causal relationship between heart attacks and work is
often indeterminable due to the nature of heart attacks and the
109. Comment, supra note 103, at 181. See also SMALL, supra note 1, § 6.3 at
117.
110. Comment, supra note 103, at 181.
111. In order for the heart attack to be compensable, it must have occurred
"by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." IND. CODE § 22-3-2-2
(1976).
112. Hellmuth & Hellmuth, supra note 107, at 115.
113. Goshkin, Legislative Action, the Only Reasonable Solution to the Pro-
blems of Workmen's Compensation Heart Cases, 5 FORUM 329, 334-35 (1970).
114. Hellmuth & Hellmuth, supra note 107, at 115.
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language barrier between doctors and lawyers, some courts have
added restrictions to "accident" in an attempt to separate worthy
heart attack claims from unworthy ones. The Dykes court, in an ef-
fort to obtain what it considered to be a closer causal connection
between the heart attack and the work, or at least to restrict the
number of compensable claims for heart attack victims, established
a definition for accident which required an event or happening
beyond the normal duties of the employment."' However a more
restrictive requirement for accident should not be substituted for a
failure to ascertain the existence of a causal connection. Problems
concerning the causal connection between work and injury should be
remedied by changes in the requirements of the term "arising out
of.'. The requirements of this term are subjective in nature and
therefore appropriate for deciding if a causal connection exists. " 7
When the problem posed by heart attacks is identified as the
reason for the implementation of the "unusual-exertion or event"
test, it becomes clear that the Dykes court failed miserably in its at-
tempted remedy. As a whole Indiana workmen's compensation law
has been hindered as a result of Dykes. This is evinced by the
following factors. First, the courts are terribly confused regarding
what a claimant must experience in order to have been involved in
an "accident."'"8 Thus it is possible for two claimants to suffer iden-
tical injuries in identical factual situations for which one will be com-
pensated and the other will be denied compensation-depending
upon the way Dykes is interpreted by the courts."'
Secondly, the unusual-exertion test attributed to the Dykes
court is not effective or appropriate for determining compensability.
The unusual-exertion test eliminates all claims for compensation for
115. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
116. The term of the definition of a compensable claim that should determine a
causal connection between work and injury is "arising out of." See note 10 supra. A
solution to the problem of determining the existence of a causal connection between
work and injury is beyond the scope of this note in that the term "accident" is im-
proper for the function. Articles that deal with this problem include: Hellmuth &
Hellmuth, supra note 107; Comment, supra note 103; Note, A Reappraisal of the
"Unusual Exertion" Doctrine in the "Heart Cases" under Pennsylvania Workmen's
Compensation Law, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 126 (1972).
117. The determination of the existence of a causal connection must involve
subjective analysis in that there are no characteristics of a causal connection. Either
there is one or there is not. Therefore, each case must be judged on its own facts and
circumstances in order to tell if there is a causal connection between work and injury.
118. See the section of this note entitled "Changes and Confusion Brought
About by the Dykes Decision," pp. 541-548 supra.
119Jdd See also notes 94-104 supra and accompanying text.
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unexpected result injuries, consequently it severely limits the scope
of compensability under the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act.
Such a limitation is in conflict with the scope of the act as it was
adopted from English law,'20 and totally unnecessary when applied
to non-heart attack claims. Additionally the unusual exertion require-
ment for "accident" is a poor standard whose application often
results in unfair determinations. This is due primarily to the in-
complete analysis which results from its application."' Only the re-
quirements of the job are analyzed when the unusual-exertion test is
applied." The end result of this limited analysis is that no correla-
tion exists between the test and the purpose of determining claims
worthy of compensation. The claimant must not only suffer an acci-
dent, but the accident must be caused by an unusual exertion or
event. 3 Furthermore, the determination of what constitutes an
unusual exertion is difficult due to the unique factual situations of
the injuries for which workmen's compensation is claimed.' In view
of these problems the requirements for "accident" should be reviewed.
THE PROPER DEFINITION FOR "ACCIDENT"
After a consideration of the problems concerning "accident"
with regard to workmen's compensation, it is evident that a proper
and uniform definition for "accident" is necessary. In determining
this definition, one must consider how the term is being used now,
what is wrong with the way it is being used, and what the proper
definition should reflect.
As was previously mentioned, the determination of a causal
connection between work and heart attack is difficult.' 5 The Dykes
court, probably with this fact in mind,'" added the "unusual exertion
or event" requirement to "accident."'' After Dykes, in order for a
claimant to suffer an "accident," his injuries not only had to be
unexpected but also the result of an unusual exertion or event.'2 8
120. See notes 82-93 surpa and accompanying text.
121. See notes 94-104 supra and accompanying text.
122. Id.
123. United States Steel Co. v. Dykes, 238 Ind. 599, 613, 154 N.E.2d 111, 119
(1958). Under this case, four steps are necessary for a claim to be compensable. The in-
jury must be 1) by an untoward event not expected or designed 2) caused by an
unusual exertion or event 3) arising out of 4) and in the course of the employment.
124. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
125. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. United States Steel Co. v. Dykes, 238 Ind. 599, 601, 154 N.E.2d 111, 114
(1958).
128. Id. See note 123 supra for the effect of the decision on the requirement
for accident.
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Through the addition of this requirement, the number of compen-
sable claims for heart attack victims was limited. However, the
unusual exertion requirement has resulted in inequities and confu-
sion that far outweigh the benefits of excluding certain types of
heart attack claims.1
The problem posed by heart attacks is one of causation. In
order to determine whether the claimant's injury was caused by the
work, subjective analysis is best. Only by examining the facts and
circumstances of each case can a court determine whether the injury
was caused by the work. That is, there is no way to objectively
determine the characteristics of a causal connection-either there is
one or there is not. The Dykes court made the mistake of estab-
lishing an objective standard in the form of the unusual exertion or
event test for "accident" as a substitute for the determination of a
causal connection between heart attack and work. Consequently,
under Indiana's unusual exertion or event requirement for "acci-
dent," it is possible for a claimant who suffers an injury caused by
his work to be denied compensation.'3 This result stems from the
fact that some courts require the claimant to either be injured as a
result of an unusual exertion or event or be denied compensation.
As has been demonstrated, the use of an objective test designed to
supplant the function of other requirements often leads to in-
equitable results.
3 1
It is evident that the solution to a problem concerning the in-
ability to be certain of a causal connection between work and heart
attacks is not to add burdensome objective requirements to "acci-
dent." Problems concerning a causal connection between work and
injury would best be solved by examining the requirements and pro-
cedures that deal with causal connection. 2 The requirements of "ac-
cident" were not changed because they were inadequate for their
function." Therefore, the original requirements of "accident" should
be reinstated and they should require only that an injury be unex-
129. See the section of this note entitled "Changes and Confusion Brought
About by the Dykes Decision," pp. 541-548 supra.
130. Since the claim must satisfy four tests when an unusual exertion require-
ment is utilized, see note 123 supra, a claimant may be denied compensation even
though the causal connection between injury and work is clear, and all other re-
quirements are satisfied.
131. See examples of this at notes 94-104 supra and accompanying text.
132. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
133. They were changed in order for courts to eliminate heart attacks claims
in which the causal connection between work and injury was indeterminable. See note
106 supra.
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pected.1 M Alternatively, the accident requirement should be aban-
doned by the legislature. This action was recommended by the Na-
tional Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws:
The traditional test for determining whether an in-
jury or disease is compensable, is that the cause must be
an "accident"-sudden, unexpected, and determinate as to
time and place. This interpretation has served to bar com-
pensation for most diseases and injuries which were con-
sidered routine and usual in the place of employment.
We recommend that the "accident" requirement be
dropped as a test for compensability.35
It is clear from the findings presented in this note that the accident
requirement was meant to serve a limited purpose in the determina-
tion of a compensable claim. Further it should never be used as it is
by some Indiana courts-to deny compensation to an otherwise
legitimate claim for lack of an unusual exertion or event.
CONCLUSION
It has been demonstrated that the Dykes court's solution to the
causation problem posed by heart attacks in workmen's compensa-
tion cases has created additional problems in Indiana law. The court
mistakenly added objective terms to the accident requirement of the
statute instead of examining the causal connection between the claim-
ant's work and his injury. Clearly a causation issue must involve
subjective analysis in the form of a case by case determination of
whether the injury was indeed caused by the work. Objective re-
quirements serve no legitimate purpose in determining a causal con-
nection and are not appropriate substitutes for determining compen-
sability when the presence of a causal connection is questionable.
Indiana workmen's compensation law is still plagued by the
causation problems of heart attack claims. It is true that now only
those claimants suffering heart attacks caused by an "unusual exer-
tion or event" are assured of compensation. However, there is still
no correlation between those claimants suffering injuries worthy of
compensation and those being compensated. "Accident" is useful
134. 1B LARSON, supra note 2, § 37.20 at 7-3. See also note 135 infra and accom-
panying text.
135. THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION LAWS (Major Conclusions and Recommendations) quoted in 4 LARSON, supra note
2, supra note 2,.app. G at 614-15. (emphasis original).
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only in determining "genuine unexpectedness."'"0 If the term was
returned to its original meaning, or eliminated altogether, the prob-
lems created by the "unusual exertion or event" test would be
removed, and the Indiana courts could properly turn their attention
to the issues of causation that should have been addressed by the
Dykes court.
F. Joseph Jaskowiak
136. See 1 B. LARSON, supra note 2, § 37.20 at 7-3.
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